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Bernth Lindfors : The Archive and the 
Question of Truth 1 
Kenneth W . H a r r o w 
"this way truth lies" 
Bernth Lindfors 
In his 1978 lecture in Ibadan on " T h e Future o f African Literary 
Studies," Bernth Lindfors argues for the necessity to create an archive 
for literary studies, pleading for the heritage of the larger Nigerian com-
munity. H e calls for a Nigerian repository, inquir ing why there is none, 
and what is being done about it: "Please forgive m y monotonous ag-
gressiveness. I'm only asking the questions that your posterity w i l l ask of 
you . " Finally he brings forth the basis on which his passionate pleas rest, 
and on which his own scholarship turns as well—the core o f the kola: 
"You may wonder why I am so obsessed wi th the preservation of literary 
documents. The reason is that I believe that this way truth lies" (167). 
This is the truth o f his work: a truth that has been at the centre of 
Research in African Literatures for all the years o f his editorship 2 , and of 
his research and teaching for this long career o f scholarship and disci-
pline-shaping. This is the truth o f literary studies as understood by the 
academy: 
I believe that future generations of scholars w i l l be less cava-
lier than we have been in handling facts i f we leave them reli-
able tools to work wi th . I believe that some literary truths are 
virtually impossible to establish in the absence of trustworthy 
records. A n d I believe we have an obligation not only to seek 
the truth ourselves but also to help others seek it. The future of 
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African literary studies w i l l be glorious only i f we strive now to 
make it so. ( 167) 
Thi s is the statement of Bernth Lindfors's literary legacy. 
For me, the questions posed by claims o f truth must begin w i t h the 
notion that truth does not exist in the abstract, and is always a truth for, 
not truth per se. A truth for w h o m , one might ask, when searching the 
truth for the future. A truth, but presented by whom? A n d i f it is to be 
a collected truth, a published truth, an established, authoritative truth, 
then the question is, a truth i n whose interest? Authorized by whom? It 
is not a blithe question of cultural relativism, not a question of Nigerian 
truth versus American truth, but rather the recognition that truth is not 
an independent concept. It is bound up wi th the same forces and in-
terests that contrive to produce a culture, that is, forces wi th their own 
interests, and that are articulated i n the clothing provided by truth. Lies 
might be seen as the coverings of those who would wish their truths to 
prevail over those of others. Research and publication are never uncom-
plicated, never pure, but are always clothed. In my following comments 
I w i l l explore attempts to present approaches to truth i n the work of 
Peter Gay and Charles Hanly, who consider scientific understandings of 
the issues, and then o f the structuralist Roger Abrahams, whose l imita-
tions provide me wi th the basis for a critique of the work o f Lindfors. 
Lindfors and I had a brief exchange over our difference o f opinion 
about how to view truth, but before presenting it I would like to frame 
the issue along similar lines raised by the psychoanalyst Charles H a n l y 
and by the historian Peter Gay. In the preface to Hanly's The Problem 
of Truth in Applied Psychoanalysis (1992), Gay approaches the question 
of truth by posing the question, "what is the meaning of Rousseau's 
Contrat social' (viii)? H e presents five different hermeneutic models, 
two o f which might be construed as diametrically opposed. In the first, 
the Contrat is interpreted as an "intervention" in Genevan politics and 
in the second, part of a cont inuum of philosophical debate over issues 
involving social structures dating back to Plato. The i r " incompatibi l-
ity" is based on assumptions about context and intention, both also 
foundations for Lindfors's. In the first reading, the relevant context is 
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supplied by contemporary Genevan politics, and Rousseau's intention 
is read as an attempt to influence those local affairs in which he had 
long taken a strong interest. In the second reading, the context is sup-
plied by Rousseau's own work wi th political theorists dating back to the 
Greeks, and his intention is read in terms of his staking out a position 
"as a fully qualified participant in a centuries-long controversy among 
political theorists" (ix). Gay goes on to claim that a reading asserting 
"the Contrat social is an intervention i n Genevan politics and nothing 
more must inevitably clash wi th the reader who holds that that Contrat 
social is exclusively part of a debate stretching back to Plato" (ix). H e 
states that, "these incompatible readings cannot both be true, though 
they may, o f course, both be false" (ix). H e then backs away from the 
notion that there is one absolutely correct interpretation, even though 
the two "cannot both be true." Less over-reaching than a single Truth 
are diverse truths that are relative to the interpretive frame wi th in which 
they are developed: "there is a more modest way of assigning mean-
ing, and that is to see each as part o f a larger configuration" (ix). W i t h 
Rousseau, he goes on to say, multiple meanings are almost inevitable, 
and further, "meanings can be complementary rather than conflicting" 
(ix-x). W i t h this banal truism, Gay avoids the issue of Truth altogether, 
and yet, backs into the original terms of the debate, one which has re-
peatedly animated controversy over postmodernism: "yet [I am] insist-
ing at the same time that the Contrat social was only one book, a book 
written in the past, and not some invention, or construction, of a 20th-
century reader" (x). 
This insistence on facticity, contextualization, together w i t h authorial 
intent and textual autonomy parallels precisely Lindfors's own repudia-
tion of that literary trajectory that led from structuralism to postmod-
ernism. In 1987 Lindfors published The Blind Men and the Elephant, 
beginning his "Introduction" w i t h the following statement: " In an intel-
lectual climate dominated by formalistic theoretical concerns, biograph-
ical criticism may seem an unfashionable mode of academic discourse. 
The N e w Crit ics , the Structuralists, and now the Deconstructionists, 
by focussing intently on the internal dynamics of a text, have deperson-
alized modern literary studies by ignoring the author behind the text, 
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claiming that he or she is irrelevant to their analytical pursuits." H e 
goes on to ask, "why should anyone today take an interest in examining 
something as old-fashioned as the relationship between a human being 
and a text?" Hi s answer: 
Literature, one of man's most interesting creations, certainly is 
worthy o f rigorous scrutiny, but even the most exacting literary 
scholarship w i l l be of little value i f it does not ultimately lead 
us to a better understanding o f ourselves and others. A l though 
verbal constructs may be fascinating to contemplate solely for 
their own sake, they remain human products, and as such, 
cannot be comprehended fully unt i l they have been traced 
back to a specific human source i n a particular human environ-
ment. T h e text, i n other words, is so completely conditioned 
by its shaping context that it cannot be adequately grasped and 
appreciated without some knowledge o f its creator and the cir-
cumstances that prompted its creation. (1) 
This might be taken as Lindfors's credo, to which one might add the 
warning he attached to his chapter on Soyinka's early work and juvena-
lia in Early Nigerian Literature (1982): "literary scholars and critics who 
ignore such an important formative phase in Soyinka's career do so only 
at the risk of talking through their hats" (139-140). 
There is a continuous shifting o f the not ion of truth, from that o f the 
one correct interpretation of the text, to the "human source," the bio-
graphical site of intentionality, to the correct historical or contemporary 
frame wi th in which to situate it, to the archival presence and description 
of the literal literary object itself. The notion o f truth moves in the direc-
tion o f an ineluctable concreteness, i f not an inevitable sense of mean-
ing, and that concreteness is displaced onto the archive itself. W h e n Gay 
moves in this direction, he admits that several historical interpretations 
o f the storming o f the Bastille might be argued, but that the "fact" o f 
the Bastille's fall is irrefutable: "the fact is that the taking o f the Bastille 
happened, and happened once, and happened i n only one way" (xi). In 
this he echoes, indirectly, Lindfors's own qualification o f structuralist or 
language-oriented approaches as l imited since "verbal constructs may be 
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fascinating to contemplate solely for their own sake," but such contem-
plation would seem to be far removed from the concreteness o f factual 
situatedness wherein truth may be tracked. The dependence o f "the fact 
of the Bastille" upon the narration o f that event for its irrefutable place 
in history disappears in this assertion of historical reality. 
African literature has long been subjected to these strong claims in 
favour of concrete truths, usually presented in sociological terms. But 
the debate has fascinating ramifications, for the debate over truth ex-
tends to every epistemological field, wi th the inevitable parallels to 
science and psychoanalysis. For normative scientific practice, truth is 
never presented as the measure of knowledge, but is a k i n d of derivative 
concept that flows from notions o f correctness. Hypotheses are tested 
not for their truth-value, but to see whether the results are correct and 
consistent. The framing o f the issue takes the form o f the presentation 
of meaningful problems in such a way as to suggest that there might be 
correct or incorrect solutions. The problem might take the form o f psy-
chological symptoms, and the solution to the "jigsaw" o f messy indica-
tions, for Freud, would be a correct reading that successfully accounts 
for symptoms by tracing them back to their cause in the patient's ear-
lier chi ldhood experiences; the veracity o f the interpretation would be 
educed from the success of the analyst's treatment and cure. Reading a 
text for an author's intention follows the same k i n d of logic. Similarly, 
a scientific observation, followed by experimental testing o f hypotheses, 
would lead to the discovery of truths to the extent that those truths, 
those correct solutions, would account for the observations. H a n l y 
dubs this approach the theory o f correspondence because truth is seen to 
emerge from the correspondence between an object and its description. 
There is no mult ipl ic i ty o f meaning or indefinite play o f signification, 
but rather a form o f philosophical realism because of the grounding of 
this correspondence in a reality that is not dependent on the act of nar-
ration. 
T h e problems attached to this school of realism begin to dissolve 
along with causality, the underlying basis for positioning the notion of 
truth in terms o f a problem whose solution is to be sought, when mo-
tives rather than causes are evoked. For the competing approach to cor-
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respondence, we turn to notions of coherence where, in place o f causal-
ity, "motives become reasons" (9), thus acquiring "a wonderfully amor-
phous, open-textured nature that allows them to be correctly' construed 
in a variety of ways. Interpretation is an expansion and complication o f 
the context o f an action." A n d further, "narrative coherence becomes 
the operative criterion o f truth" wi th "as many true understandings as 
there are coherent, comprehensive, unified narratives about the motivat-
ing reasons" (9). H a n l y associates this open-ended approach wi th ideal-
ism, thus moving its grounding from object to discourse, and effectively 
eliminating any reason to turn to the term "truth" as an indicator of the 
correctness o f the solution to a problem. Stated differently, the second 
theory, that o f coherence, emphasizes the discourse which frames the event 
or problem, thus structuring the ttuth that emerges. According to the 
theory o f correspondence, the event or problem suggests what discourse 
would be appropriately utilized in order that the correct solution might 
be discovered. As H a n l y writes, "adequately formulated scientific theo-
ries or commonsense beliefs yield predictions and give rise to expecta-
tions that can be tested by observing what actually happens. These ob-
servations have meaning in their own right, independently [sic] o f the 
theories or beliefs we have about their objects" (21). In psychoanalytical 
terms, the patient who comes to an awareness o f the past causal factors 
that lead to het psychological constitution or symptoms achieves self-
awareness. If this awareness were relative to this or that model, it would 
not be self-knowledge but self-delusion. But it is based on a model that 
is relative to the psychological constitution itself. 
H a n l y applies the same reasoning to historical causation. It is not, he 
claims, historical discourses that construct events, but events that sug-
gest appropriate discourses that succeed in accounting for those events. 
Marxist or capitalist explanations o f the British Reform B i l l o f 1832 
might be put forth, but in the final analysis, "the question is what recon-
struction o f the economic factors influencing political actions during 
this period of British history is the correct one. Either the ascertainable 
facts can make a decisive contribution to the choice of an interpretative 
frame of reference, or we cannot reconstruct their significance at all : 
W e can only make more or less arbitrary conjectures" (27-8). W e are 
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back wi th Peter Gay's initial conundrum: both interpretations cannot 
be right, and the facts must decide which is correct. That "facts" must 
be selected is glossed over when we are told that "the Bastille is a fact," 
that neurotic symptoms are facts, that dreamwork is a fact, that the text 
is a fact, that the context wi th in which it was penned was a fact. Facts 
serve as the basis for truth; i f truth is to be educed, facts, it would seem, 
are simply there, unproblematic in their detachment from observation, 
discourse, narration. 
Facts, intentions, truth cannot be separated from textuality. If we 
bui ld Truth on the "solid bedrock o f facts," and interpretations on read-
ings guided by facts, including the facts of a biographical or historical 
nature, i.e. on their content, then we w i l l be following a model that w i l l 
lead us back to the issues of authorial intention. As Foucault and others 
have shown 3 , however, intention must be articulated in a discourse; the 
tracing and selection of facts must be mediated wi th in a universe shaped 
by discourse, and that discourse read in terms of interest and thus ide-
ology. I f we ask the question of where the work of interest is located in 
this trajectory back to facts and intentions, where the work of interest 
lies i n the obscuring or disavowal o f discourse, o f ideological interpel-
lation, then we are proceeding with the assumption that facts or inten-
tion cannot speak for themselves—unproblematically, unmediated, in 
a disinterested fashion. It is not that facts are irrelevant, but that they 
cannot be proffered as a bedrock for Truth since the choice of facts is de-
terminate in the selection of the appropriate discourse, and that choice 
in turn is framed by an interest shaping the ideological understanding 
of truth. O n e might say that the facts are interpellated, and that their 
response constitutes the discourse. W i t h i n the frame, the discourse 
functions i n accordance wi th the conditions o f possibility that have 
established the notion of truth as corresponding to certain facts. That 
is the "diagnosis" of the facts, and both facts and discourse depend on 
each other. Questions of interest, of a truth for whom, are obscured in 
the displacements involved when truth is posited in terms of accuracy 
o f the diagnosis, accuracy of the facts, the constitutive elements o f the 
bios and socius. 
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In The Last Supper (1976), the director Tomas Guttierez Alea creates 
a scene in which a Cuban plantation owner restages the last supper wi th 
himself as Chris t and his slaves as the apostles. H e tells a story, the point 
o f which is that all we have to offer to the L o r d is our suffering, imply ing 
that the slaves should patiently bear their lot and present their suffering 
as a gift to G o d so that they w i l l be able to enter into Heaven. T h e slave 
owner drinks too much and falls asleep. T h e most recalcitrant of the 
slaves then tells his story: O n e time O f o l i created two beings, Truth and 
Lies. B o t h travelled together around the earth, and wherever they went, 
the beautiful Truth was welcomed and treated w i t h hospitality and gen-
erosity, whereas Lies, who was ugly, was excluded and despised. O n e 
day Lies cut o l ì Truth's head w i t h his machete. Truth, who was b l ind , 
groped around unt i l he felt Lies's head, reached over and ripped Lies's 
head from his body; he then placed it on his own. Ever since, Truth has 
gone through the wor ld , wi th Lies's head on his body, deceiving people 
into welcoming h i m i n . The house slave i n the film objects that Master 
would not lie, that his story was not a deception or covering o f the truth. 
But the image o f truth, represented i n the film as wearing the head of 
a pig on top of a human body, stays before the eyes o f the audience, a 
forceful figure of the rebellious slave's rejection o f the dominant ideol-
ogy. The film is centred upon a slave revolt i n Cuba , set i n the time of 
the Enlightenment, w i t h an economy based on sugar plantations that 
generated considerable wealth, and w h i c h were marked by the radical 
separation between African slave and European master. T h e two narra-
tives— the master's marked by a soundtrack o f baroque music, the slave's 
by music w i t h African tonalities—suggest a dialectical opposition be-
tween cultures. But the violent jo ining o f truth to lies functions not only 
as a response to the European mystifications (the Christ ian parable) but 
as an alternative model to the European not ion of H i g h Culture and its 
accompanying binary o f Truth/Lies. 
T h e Africanized truth is not s imply a combination or complication of 
unicity; it is more than an embracing of conflict or open-endedness, as 
Abrahams would have it in his interpretation of the Afr ican folktale: 
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The high energy of the dialogue cannot be neglected in an un-
derstanding of how these stories come into being. Just as many 
o f these stories themselves discuss the coming apart of family, 
friendships, community, the way the stories emerge in contests 
underscores the enduring nature o f the oppositions. Achieving 
a sense of closure, o f strong and definite conclusion, is a condi-
tion regarded as neither possible nor desirable. (15) 
H e concludes that, "life is celebrated through the dramatizing of oppo-
sitions" (156). A t once it is the tensions that sustain the story, and al-
ternatively, or complementarily, it is life itself that is marked by tension 
and opposition. Abrahams's explanations have a powerful hermeneutic 
quality since the problems he poses are so masterfully solved. But the 
nature of the solution, correct i n the nature of truth, limps along when 
the powerful thrust of the pig's head speaks in the name of truth. 
T h e structural model deployed by Abrahams does not suffice to ex-
plain the porcine image, because i f it leads truth and lies into an open-
ended state of conflict, it brings closure wi th the explanation of the 
conflict as indicative of an underlying vitalism. But the slave's gesture 
of r ipping off the pig's head, and his placement of the pig's head over 
his own, is so excessive precisely because it is enacted by the most pow-
erfully recalcitrant of the slaves, the one whose refusal to submit to the 
stocks, to the savagery of the overseer's act of cutting off his ear, ignites 
the fires of the revolt throughout the plantation. 
Here it is not a question o f the bedrock of solid evidence. It is not a 
truth i n the form o f a "naked abstraction." W h a t burns are the founda-
tions of the master's discourse: the slaves' quarters and adjacent bui ld-
ings, the wooden frames that supported the truth of the mastet's par-
able. These are the material inscriptions o f his interest, and in Alea's 
imagery o f the fugitive slave i n revolt can be glimpsed the contours of a 
refusal that w i l l not be reduced to a statement of disinterested truth. 
After the fire, the master arrives and surveys the burnt wreckage of 
his property. To situate ourselves wi th in the gaze of the master, and to 
be thus caught up i n the smouldering materiality o f the ruins, is to lose 
sight o f the interest that was served by the former construction of the 
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plantation, and more, to lose sight of the system o f brutal labour on 
which it was built , to lose sight of the relationship between the white 
sugar that was being produced and the black labour that produced it. 
This is the working o f commodity fetishism i n which the disavowal 
works i n tandem wi th the embrace of the fetishized object. To become 
conscious o f that relationship, to recognize the process of disavowal and 
the role that interest or desire plays i n the construction o f models of 
truth, o f ideological systems, is not to discount the materiality, the fac-
ticity of the embodied symptom or fetishized object. It is not to ignore 
the "facts" on which the house o f truth is built. Neither is it to discover 
in the site o f disavowal, of interest, another location for unalloyed truth. 
T h e slave's act o f replacing Truth's head wi th Lies's does not merely sub-
stitute one truth for another, does not unmask falsity so as to eliminate 
its presence. But it is does suggest that the facts do not present them-
selves to the interpretive gaze i n a vacuum. 
In a trickster's tale recounted by Abrahams, hare finally defeats the 
powerful leopard who has betrayed a bushbuck who freed h i m from 
a trap. Hare naively asks the leopard to demonstrate how he had been 
caught in the trap in the first place: " ' N o w , ' said the hare, setting the 
trap, 'wi l l you just show me how you got caught? O f course, i f you are 
trapped, I w i l l free you again'" (198). N o sooner does the leopard step 
into the trap than he is caught, and in the end ki l led by the man who 
finds h i m . T h e hare lied to the leopard; and over and over again in trick-
ster's tales, truth is told through Lies's head. O n e trick deserves another; 
one truth is undone by another. O n e lie gives birth to an entire wor ld 
engendered by denial, revolt, violence, death. This is not a question of 
the dissipation o f meaning, but a reconfiguration o f truth. To be sure 
we can frame this story so as to suggest the solution, provide the expla-
nation for the hare's success, the reason for his having to lie, to trick 
the leopard. W e can close the story as the man closes the trap on the 
leopard: "the man soon found the leopard in the snare and ki l led h i m " 
(198). As he dies, the celebration o f life is made possible. T h e truth 
conveyed by the hare's lie is displaced by the structuralist interpretation 
that sets opposites into place i n a vitalist reading of traditional narra-
tive. Lindfors's archive is set in mot ion by this reading as it confirms 
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our certainties about the place of meaning w i t h i n the frame of concrete 
contextualized worlds. 
Here is Lindfors's explanation of how truth would function i n such 
a universe: 
I'm not sure I can fully agree wi th your notion of the unreli-
ability or impurity of " t ruth , " for it seems to me that there are 
some concepts that are universally accepted as valid in whatev-
er culture they appear. Take most o f the Ten Commandments , 
for example. Except for the first, which might lead to quarrels 
over primacy i n such places as India or Igboland where there 
are many competing gods of more or less equal stature, the 
other directives would probably be considered as correct guides 
to conduct all over the globe. Granted, literary truths may not 
rise to that level o f near-unanimous endorsement, but I'm not 
sure every claim made by literary scholars w o u l d necessarily 
be open to challenge by colleagues operating from a different 
epistemological base or bias. The statement that The Palm-
wine Drinkard was published by Faber and Faber in 1952, for 
instance, does seem to have an unassailable truth about it that 
no reasonable person would be likely to wish to dispute. A n d 
perhaps it is the accumulation o f small truths of this sort that 
w i l l help to establish the veracity or falsity of larger claims that 
can be contested, as, for instance, the answers offered to such 
questions as "why was it published in London?, " " i n whose in -
terest was it published?," "why was it received so negatively in 
Nigeria?"—questions requiring interpretation o f the basic facts 
of the matter. In other words, though some truths may be con-
tingent, others may attain that level of naked abstraction that 
you seem reluctant to recognize or acknowledge. I would hope 
that the larger claims—the meta-interpretations, i f you w i l l — 
would always be secured as firmly as possible on a bedrock of 
solid evidence. A n d this is often what appears to be lacking in 
some of the theoretical work being done on postcolonial litera-
tures. T h e theorist, floating free on his own construct of ab-
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stractions, his own house o f cards, doesn't touch ground often 
enough to anchor his ideas in material realities, so the whole 
enterprise can be b lown over by the smallest passing reference 
to documented facts. N o t that we don't need theorists to carry 
us beyond our ordinary mundane concerns, but it w o u l d be 
helpful i f some o f them could keep at least one foot on the 
ground while reaching for the stars. I suppose you could say of 
theory what I once said of literary documents: "this way truth 
lies;" but the word "lies" might be construed to have a very dif-
ferent meaning from what I intended, since its application to 
theory would appear to have more to do wi th lying than wi th 
laying. C a n the truth lie? C a n the lie be true? I ' l l leave you to 
wrestle wi th those questions. But thanks for putt ing m y work 
in some perspective.4 (Lindfors, Bernth. "Thanksgiving. " E-
mail to the author. 22 Nov. 2001) 
In m y response, I evoked something of the relative nature o f the notion 
of truth, embracing a position H a n l y referred to as one o f "coherence," 
in contrast to Lindfors's not ion of "correspondence." I concluded wi th 
this statement: 
Let us have an informed criticism, to be sure; and when one is 
informed as best one can be, let the dialogue between text and 
critic generate the critical response. There's enough truth for me 
in the insights o f a really good m i n d , and those insights would 
not be very insightful i f they were disconnected from 1952 and 
Faber and Faber. I think we get misled when the word "truth" 
comes into play. Claims to speak the truth or to speak for the 
truth can't be separated from the position o f power occupied by 
the speaker. O n e can speak on speaker's corner, but that truth 
won't weigh i n against the truth spoken from the oval office 
or the pulpit . A n d the truth o f Cambridge University Press 
might count more than from some small press. I don't think 
the truth speaks for itself. That The Palm-Wine Drinkard ap-
peared in 1952 has to be articulated to be published and heard. 
I can say it in a vacuum, but that is meaningless, like an un-
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published novel that no one has read. A n d the minute it has 
to be articulated and published, it is mediated by the speaker, 
the language, and the means of publication and distribution. 
If no one knew that The Palm- Wine Drinkard had really been 
published earlier and elsewhere, what weight would such a fact 
have, what truth w o u l d it have i f no one knew or could ever 
know it? N o t much , I think (Harrow "Thanksgiving") 
Rather than end on this familiar note that rehearses Hanly's summation 
o f coherence, accentuated by a Foucauldian notion of discursive power 
and authority, I prefer to evoke the figure of Lies's porcine head resting 
on Truth's body, making its way through the world , in a space imagined 
by a slave in revolt, that slave himself the imaginary construction o f a 
Cuban filmmaker reconstructing the truth of slavery in his country at 
a time when the artists were struggling with the painful consttaints o f a 
post-revolutionary regime. For Freud displacement ends when we suc-
cessfully trace back the causative factors i n the psychohistory that ac-
counts for the patient's symptoms. Lindfors too would bring closure 
to the work of tracing back the truth by housing the hard facts in the 
secure vaults o f the archive. The nub of Lindfors's argument rests on 
an archeological model : "perhaps it is the accumulation of small truths 
[...] that w i l l help to establish the veracity or falsity of larger claims that 
can be contested, [... that is] questions requiring interpretation of the 
basic facts o f the matter" (Lindfors, Bernth. "Thanksgiving. " E-mail to 
the author. 22 Nov. 2001). For Gay, the fact o f the Bastille is one such 
small truth. But the dating of July 14 t h, or of the publication o f The 
Palm-wine Drinkard, w i l l not perform the work of establishing an inter-
pretive claim, only of verifying one which is always already made. That 
is the claim of meaning, or, when articulated in terms o f correspon-
dence, truth. It tells o f nothing except that here lay the foundations of 
a bui ld ing inside which prisoners were kept. But for me there is some-
thing short of the truth that returns to the scene, like the trickster or 
the smoke of the ruins, something that is often termed "lies"—a site of 
excess and resistance without the secure grounding in the paradigmatic 
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logic o f problem and solution to provide us wi th guidance to correct-
ness and truth. 5 
Notes 
1 This paper builds upon my initial wotk on the role o f the atchive in Lindfors's 
thinking, published as "Bernth Lindfots and the Archive of African Litetature" 
in Research in African Literatures 32.4 (Winter 2001): 147-54. 
2 In "The Six Commandments," his essay dealing with the principles of his edi-
torship of RAL, he urges prospective conttibutors o f work on written African 
literature to be "factual, argumentative, and ttue" (1995: 144—45). 
3 Foucault's classic argument i n "What Is an Author" need not be teheatsed. His 
statement about the authot's function strikingly indicates the conttasting views 
of the author In one, the author is the historical source of the text, in the other 
the one whose writings and intentions function to delimit an already existing 
discourse: 
the author is not an indefinite source of significations which fill a work; 
the authot does not precede the works, he is a certain functional prin-
ciple by which, in our culture, one limits, excludes, and chooses; in 
short by which one impedes the free circulation, the free manipulation, 
the free composition, decomposition, and recomposition of fiction. In 
fact, i f we are accustomed to presenting the authot as a genius, as a per-
petual surging of invention, it is because, in reality, we make h i m func-
tion in exactly the opposite fashion. One can say that the author is an 
ideological product, since we represent him as the opposite ofhis historically 
real function" ( emphasis added 159). 
4 H e concludes on this humorous note: 
The two articles in RAL and the forthcoming panel at the M L A are 
statting to make me uncomfottably self-conscious. A l l this attention 
is getting quite embarrassing. I'm beginning to feel rathet like Ernest 
Hemingway must have felt when he crawled out of the jungle a few 
weeks after his famous air crash in the Congo and read all the glowing 
obituaries that had been written about h im. Alfred Nobel had a simi-
lat experience but his premature obituaries were decidedly negarive, 
saying what a mean, tight old bastard he had been; sobered by this ex-
perience, he established the Nobel Prizes so people would think better 
of h i m . I don't have any riches to spend on improving my reputation 
posthumously so I hope the bad press comes after I am really gone. But 
with so many people kicking me upstairs at present, I feel I ought to 
do the honorable thing and retire tight now. I could pethaps continue 
writing undet a pseudonym, thereby allowing my friends unwittingly 
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to express far more honest opinions on my work. Burnt Limpfoot or 
Bent Windfart might work as appropriate names, but someone with a 
good ear might blow my cover. (Lindfors "Thanksgiving.") 
5 A possible way out of the debate over truth might be to turn to the newer term 
"information" that crops up in quantum theory. According to John Archibald 
Wheeler, reality is quantized because it is " i n some sense made of information" 
(Overbye D 3 ) . As that information is subject to the uncertainty principle, we 
can know where a particle is, but not where it came from, or where it wi l l strike a 
detector. Its relationship to a causal model is l imited by the fact that what can be 
known is structured and modified by our act of observing it, in such a way as to 
disrupt the l ink between present coordinates and past or future ones. According 
to another physicist, A n t o n Zeilinger, as a result of observing the path a particle 
takes, we cannot determine its position; it remains "irreducibly random." H e 
adds, "this randomness is an indication of a 'reality independent of us'" (D3). 
If truth is the equivalent of a knowledge that provides us with a correspondence 
to a reality that is independent o f us, quantum physics would seem to rely not 
upon causality but the sign of randomness to validate that reality. Or , in another 
frame, we could say the play o f the trickster would seem to be at work. 
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